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We study the association among different sources of individual differences such as
personality, cognitive ability and risk attitudes with trust and reciprocate behavior in
an incentivized experimental binary trust game in a sample of 220 (138 females)
undergraduate students. The game involves two players, player 1 (P1) and player 2
(P2). In the first stage, P1 decides whether to trust and let P2 decide, or to secure
an egalitarian payoff for both players. If P1 trusts P2, the latter can choose between
a symmetric payoff that is double than the secure alternative discarded by P1, and
an asymmetric payoff in which P2 earns more than in any other case but makes P1
worse off. Before the main experiment, we obtained participants’ scores for Abstract
Reasoning (AR), risk attitudes, basic personality characteristics, and specific traits such
as psychopathy and impulsivity. During the main experiment, we measured Heart Rate
(HR) and ElectroDermal Activity (EDA) variation to account for emotional arousal caused
by the decision and feedback processes. Our main findings indicate that, on one
hand, P1 trust behavior associates to positive emotionality and, specifically, to the
extraversion’s warmth facet. In addition, the impulsivity facet of positive urgency also
favors trust behavior. No relation to trusting behavior was found for either other major
personality aspects or risk attitudes. The physiological results show that participants
scoring high in psychopathy exhibit increased EDA and reduced evoked HR deceleration
at the moment in which they are asked to decide whether or not to trust. Regarding
P2, we find that AR ability and mainly low disagreeable disinhibition favor reciprocal
behavior. Specifically, lack of reciprocity significantly relates with a psychopathic, highly
disinhibited and impulsive personality. Thus, the present study suggests that personality
characteristics would play a significant role in different behaviors underlying cooperation,
with extraversion/positive emotionality being more relevant for initiating cooperation, and
low disagreeable disinhibition for maintaining it.
Keywords: behavioral economics, psychopathy, personality, experiment, trust game, risk attitudes
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INTRODUCTION
Cooperation between strangers is an essential characteristic
of human societies that differentiates us from other animal
species (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Central processes for
understanding such cooperation are trust and reciprocity
(Nowak, 2006; Walker and Ostrom, 2009; Balliet and van
Lange, 2013). In accordance to the centrality of these behaviors
for important social, economic and political outcomes, they
have become a relevant topic in classic disciplines, such as
anthropology, sociology, evolutionary biology, psychology or
economics, and in new emerging interdisciplinary fields, such
as neuroeconomics (Loewenstein et al., 2008) and behavioral
economics (Kahneman, 2003; Camerer et al., 2011). One of the
most powerful tools for the development of these fields has been
the use of economic games (Evans and Krueger, 2009; King-Casas
and Chiu, 2012; Sharp, 2012). Economic games are multiplayer
decision-making tasks originally developed within mathematical
theory to analyze strategic decision-making among economic
agents. Later, they have been extensively used as well-controlled,
flexible, and replicable behavioral paradigms to model social
interactions such us cooperation, trust, altruism, reciprocity, or
retaliation, making them ideal for bridging the gap between
theory and naturalistic data (Zhao and Smillie, 2015).
One experimental economic game frequently used for the
study of cooperative behavior is the Trust Game1 (TG), originally
developed by Berg et al. (1995) to measure trust, and to show
the importance of positive reciprocity in cooperation. Positive
reciprocity is defined as the costly behavior of a second mover
(trustee) that reward a kind behavior of the first mover (trustor)
(Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), whereas trust in this game would
be defined as a voluntary transfer of own money to another
subject, with future reciprocation expected but not guaranteed
(Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002). The amount sent by the trustor is
multiplied by some factor and received by the trustee, who in turn
chooses to send all, some, or none of the received money back
to the sender. Although the mathematically computed subgame
perfect equilibrium solution of the TG predicts no transfer and no
return, there are two main results systematically found: trustors
tend to invest positive amounts and trustees to reciprocate to
some extent (Johnson and Mislin, 2011).
Importantly, there are individual differences in these
behaviors, i.e., people differ quantitatively in the extent of
investment of the trustor and the reciprocation of the trustee.
Interestingly, a significant portion of these individual differences
are attributed to genetic factors, with heritability estimates
ranging from 10 to 32% for trust behavior, and from 17 to 32%
for trustworthiness, depending on the sample, Swedish or U.S.,
and the model, ACE or AE, (Cesarini et al., 2008). Personality is
also under relevant genetic influences (Vukasovic and Bratko,
2015), and the potential role of personality at the basis of these
behaviors has been widely acknowledged (Borghans et al., 2008;
Ferguson et al., 2011; Heckman, 2011; Zhao and Smillie, 2015).
Thus, the main objective of the present study is to explain
(part of) these individual differences by means of personality
1Also called the ‘investment game.’
characteristics. Our major strength and novelty is that we try
to explore this association systematically: we assess personality
dimensions of the two more relevant personality models of the
last decades, the Big Three and the Big Five and explore the
role of more specific personality traits. Specifically, we focus on
two aspects that could be relevant for collaborative behaviors,
not previously examined in the TG: subclinical psychopathy
and impulsivity. Examining the personality domains and traits
associated to trust and reciprocity will help explaining relevant
basic processes underlying cooperative behavior.
Among the most influential personality models in the last
decades, those of Eysenck (1992) and McCrae and Costa (2008)
are especially relevant for cooperative behavior. In an attempt
to link psychological disorders to normal personality, Eysenck
(1992) proposed three basic dimensions or facets: Extraversion
(E), Neuroticism (N), and Psychoticism (P). P is conceived
as normal personality dimension of vulnerability to antisocial
behavior and psychopathy, whereas low P would be characterized
by traits as empathy, socialization and cooperativeness (Eysenck,
1992). In the other hand, the most widely used and integrative
model of personality nowadays is the Five-Factor Model (FFM)
(John et al., 2008). This model encompasses five personality
dimensions: E, N, Openness to Experience (O), Agreeableness
(A) and Conscientiousness (C) (McCrae and Costa, 2008). These
domains include specific facets of A and E, such as trust, altruism,
straightforwardness, tender-mindedness or warmth that could be
especially relevant in interpersonal relationships and for trust and
reciprocity (Evans and Revelle, 2008). Consequently, it would
be expected that the personality characteristics more relevant
in interpersonal behavior, such us A and E would facilitate
cooperative behavior, whereas the opposite, exploiting other
people and parasitic behavior, would be predicted by low A, P
and psychopathic-like characteristics.
Only a few studies have investigated the role of personality
domains and their effects on trust and reciprocity in the TG, and
no study has explored the role of theoretically relevant specific
traits such as impulsivity or psychopathic-like personality. In
relation to broad personality dimensions, we deal first with
investment behavior of P1, i.e., trust. Although the results are
relatively heterogeneous, they tend to show that those personality
domains more related to interpersonal behavior, i.e., E and A,
were the more consistent personality correlates of trust. Evans
and Revelle (2008) found that A was associated with investing,
mediated by the trait of trust. Using a strategic version of the
TG, Becker et al. (2012) showed a significant correlation between
the amount sent as a first mover and A, O and low C. Similarly,
Müller and Schwieren (2012) found that the amount sent by the
investor correlates significantly with low C and low N, and also
significantly positive with A. Swope et al. (2008) found that E
was associated with more sending in the TG. Accordingly, Ben-
Ner and Halldorsson (2010) found that E and low C were strong
predictors of the amount sent to a partner by investors. Also,
Haring et al. (2013), using a humanoid robot as a trustee, found
that the more extravert a person was, the higher the amount sent
in the TG. It is interesting to note that some of these studies
found a certain effect of low C on trust behavior (Ben-Ner and
Halldorsson, 2010; Becker et al., 2012), probably reflecting the
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role of low deliberation and impulsivity in the decision to trust
or not to trust (Müller and Schwieren, 2012).
With regard to trustee behavior, studies seem to suggest a
moderate and consistent role of A on reciprocity and, conversely,
of low agreeableness-related traits on exploitation behavior.
Thus, Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) found that the only
personality domain associated to the proportion of received
money that is actually sent back was A. Also, Becker et al. (2012)
obtained that reciprocity was significantly correlated with A and
O. Similarly, Thielmann and Hilbig (2015a) have found that
Honesty-Humility, a domain strongly related to the A (Gaughan
et al., 2012), predicts trustee returns in three experiments on
different variations of the TG. Last, Lönnqvist et al. (2012) found
that those participants being both high on N and low on A
transferred back much less than did other participants when
receiving low investments.
Lönnqvist et al. (2012) have highlighted the fact that the
joint presence of high N and low A is (together with low C) a
combination typical of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD)
patients (Saulsman and Page, 2004; Samuel and Widiger, 2008).
Accordingly, it has been shown that persons with BPD present
a striking deficit in trust and reciprocation. When compared
with the healthy controls, BPD patients tend to: (a) transfer a
smaller amount of monetary units in a TG when acting as investor
(Unoka et al., 2009); and (b) send lower returns when acting as a
trustee (King-Casas et al., 2008). It is important to note that a core
characteristic of BPD patients is impulsivity, mainly the urgency
facets (Whiteside et al., 2005), supporting the above mentioned
idea that disinhibition/impulsivity traits may play a role in the
TG decisions.
But probably the personality disorder more strongly
associated to non-cooperative behavior is Psychopathy.
Psychopathy is characterized by traits such as social
manipulation, exploitation, egocentrism, irresponsibility,
deceitfulness, superficial charm, lack of remorse and shallow
affect (Miller et al., 2001), and a central characteristic from an
evolutionary perspective would be the success of psychopaths
in exploiting social emotions of trust and cooperativeness
(Mealey, 1995). In terms of the Five Factor Model, psychopathic
characteristics may be understood as the extreme end of a
continuum along normal personality functioning, and would be
strongly represented in (low) A and (low) C domains (Miller
et al., 2001; Miller and Lynam, 2003; Gaughan et al., 2012), with
the interpersonal affective components (primary psychopathy)
more closely related to low A, and the impulsivity and social
deviance features (secondary psychopathy) more closely related
to low C (Miller et al., 2008).
Surprisingly, the role of psychopathic characteristics has not
been explored yet in the TG, although, studies in other economic
games seem to indicate that psychopaths, both clinical and
sub-clinical, have a tendency to behave in a non-cooperative
way. Mokros et al. (2008) found that criminal psychopaths,
compared with healthy participants, were markedly more prone
to competitive behavior, as well as to non-adherence to the
principles of fairness, as evidenced by greater accumulated
reward and exploitation of partners Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
(PDG). Similarly, primary-psychopath participants were both
less generous to social partners in a dictator game and more
likely to reject ungenerous offers in an ultimatum game (Koenigs
et al., 2010). Montañés-Rada et al. (2003) found that patients with
Antisocial Personality Disorder, a personality disorder strongly
related to psychopathy (Widiger and Mullins-Sweatt, 2009),
showed more non-cooperative behavior both in the presence
and in the absence of a non-cooperative opponent using various
modifications of the PDG played against a simulated opponent.
A similar tendency has been observed in non-clinical
individuals scoring high on different psychopathy scales. Rilling
et al. (2007) found that dyads of high-psychopathy individuals
were more likely to lead to mutual defection (non-cooperation)
relative to low-psychopathy dyads. In addition, they found a high
correlation between non-cooperative behavior and psychopathy
scores among the male participants of their sample. Curry
et al. (2011), using simultaneous one-shot discrete, continuous
and sequential PDG, found that undergraduates with higher
scores in Machiavellian Egocentricity PPI subscale, a marker
for psychopathy (Benning et al., 2003), cooperated less in
simultaneous PDG and were less likely to initiate or reciprocate
cooperation in sequential PD games. Gillespie et al. (2013)
examine the effects of primary (selfish, uncaring) and secondary
(impulsive, irresponsible) psychopathic personality traits on the
responses of undergraduate participants to the in-group and the
out-group (defined in terms of affiliation to a UK University) in
dictator and ultimatum games. They found significant differences
in game proposals to members of the in-group and the out-
group, between low and high scoring participants on secondary
psychopathic traits. Using a PDG with a computerized opponent,
Johnston et al. (2014) found that participants with low levels
of psychopathic traits exhibited increased social cooperation in
the context of affective feedback, and that poor cooperation was
uniquely predicted by high levels of psychopathic traits. Taken
together, these findings seem to confirm that non-cooperative
social actions are the norm among high-psychopathy individuals
in social-dilemma, mainly ultimatum and PDG (King-Casas and
Chiu, 2012).
Another source of individual differences that could also
contribute to cooperative behavior could be general intelligence.
Previous research has reported evidence of a positive correlation
between intelligence and self-reported trust (e.g., Sturgis et al.,
2010; Hooghe et al., 2012; Carl and Billari, 2014). Regarding
trust behavior in economic games, a meta-analysis of 36
studies that used a repeated PDG and school-level average
SAT and ACT scores as proxies for the intelligence, showed
that students cooperate 5–8% more often for every 100-point
increase in the school’s average SAT score (Jones, 2008). Similarly,
Burks et al. (2009) using a one-shot sequential PDG in a
sample of truck driving students found that subjects with
greater intelligence more accurately forecast others’ behavior and
differentiate their behavior more strongly, depending on the
first-mover’s choice. Additionally, players with higher cognitive
abilities reciprocated cooperation in the second round of this
PDG significantly more than low intelligent subjects. Specifically,
in a series of incentivized trust games, Corgnet et al. (2015)
showed that cognitive ability is positively correlated to trust
but not with trustworthy behavior. Thus, individuals’ cognitive
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ability/intelligence has been associated with cooperative play in
economic games.
Pro-social behavior may also be related to individuals’ risk
attitudes. In fact, Luhmann (1988) and Coleman (1990) describe
trust from the viewpoint of standard economics as a subclass
of situation involving risk. However, Fehr (2009) states that
strong neurobiological as well as behavioral evidence indicates
that this view is untenable. Accordingly, behavioral studies
have consistently failed in finding any relationship between risk
aversion and trust behavior in the investment game (e.g., Bohnet
and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008; Houser et al., 2010).
Last, the attentional resources and emotional consequences
of decision making in the TG are also interesting to study.
For example, the conflict between individual and interpersonal
considerations may induce different emotional reactions. Also,
the attention of a subject in anticipation of the monetary
and emotional consequences associated with decision making
in the TG could be the result of interaction between the
context and a decision maker’s personality. Lorber (2004)
investigates the relations of HR and EDA with psychopathy
through a meta-analysis of 95 studies. Low resting and task
EDA were positively associated with psychopathy, indicating
impaired emotional regulation (Casey et al., 2013). Moreover,
EDA reactivity was negatively associated with psychopathy.
Contrary to the aforementioned relation between EDA and
psychopathy, the latter was not associated with HR. In
contrast, the relation between cardiac reactivity and psychopathy
is less clear (Lorber, 2004; Casey et al., 2013). Here, we
investigate these two physiological variables to probe the level
of emotional and attentional engagement during the crucial trust
decision.
To sum up, collaborative and altruistic behavior is central in
human societies. A sequence of trust and reciprocity is usually
assumed to be the small-group paradigm equivalent of a society
in which citizens trust each other and deserve to be trusted,
thus avoiding wasteful use of. An ideal experimental paradigm to
examine these behaviors is the TG. In the discrete form adopted
here, TG can be seen as a sequential social dilemma type of
situation. If P1, who is the first mover, chooses not to trust P2,
an egalitarian outcome emerges. Otherwise, if P1 trusts P2, the
latter chooses between an egalitarian outcome, which is Pareto-
superior to the one discarded by P1 and an unequal one which is
favorable to P2 and unfavorable to P1.
The major strength and novelty of this study is that it
systematically explores the association between behavior in the
trust game with personality and cognitive abilities. To this end,
a broad set of personality domains and specific personality facets
are assessed. Specifically, we focused on two personality aspects
that could be potentially relevant for collaborative behaviors:
impulsivity and psychopathy.
No previous studies have directly explored the relationship
between psychopathy and behavior in the TG. Considering
the non-cooperative, exploitative and parasitic life-style of
psychopaths, it is expected that their tendency to benefit from
others’ effort and trust would manifest in no reciprocating
behavior. Indeed, the TG would be paradigmatic for assessing
exploitative and other predatory-related behaviors closely related
to psychopathy traits, since one central issue for exploitation
is exploitability, that is, the observable signs linked with
the likelihood of being victimized (Buss and Duntley, 2008).
Accordingly, P2’s decision would represent an ideal context for
expression of psychopathy-like behavior because P1 is in total
exploitability by P2, who can benefit from P1’s trust without
receiving any negative consequences.
Conversely, agreeable and extraverted individuals tend to
show more pro-social behavior, to cooperate more, to trust
in other people, even strangers, and to respond in a positive
way in front of kind and altruistic behaviors. Thus, A and E
constitute the personality pillars of interpersonal relations, with
A covering the quality of social interaction and E favoring the
quantity of social interaction. Accordingly, one main hypothesis
is that trust in the TG would be mainly associated to E
and A, whereas reciprocity would be mainly associated to A.
Conversely, psychopathy scores would be mainly associated to
non-reciprocity and, in a lesser extent, to lack of trust.
Another underexplored area of personality effects on
economic games is impulsivity. Impulsivity is a multifaceted
construct of emotional-driven facets (positive and negative
urgency), cognitive and behavioral features, (lack of both
deliberation and perseverance), and sensitivity to reward
(sensation seeking) (Whiteside and Lynam, 2001; Cyders
et al., 2007). Because of lack of precedents, our hypotheses are
general and speculative. In view of the reviewed literature, we
hypothesize that impulsivity facets link to positive reinforcement
would favor the more rewarding options in the TG, that is, to
trust for P1, and to no-reciprocate for P2. Last, we hypothesize
a positively relation of trust with cognitive ability and no
association with risk-aversion.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Procedure
The experiment was run on two different dates. On the first date,
220 (138 females) undergraduate participants were recruited at
the Individual Differences and Psychopathology (IDAP) Lab of
the Universitat Jaume I. They signed a consent form for the
entire experiment which they were informed that would take
place on two dates and in two different labs. Then, they were
asked to answer different socio-demographic and personality
questionnaires.
On a second date, the same subjects were invited to the
Laboratorio de Economía Experimental (LEE) of the same
university to play a TG with real monetary incentives.2 We
divided the sample in P1 or Trustor (N = 110, 71 females) and
P2 or Trustee (N = 110, 67 females) players (see Figure 1).
This part of the experiment was carried out in 28 sessions
of eight subjects each (forming four random and anonymous
2The data reported here are part of a larger study on personality traits and behavior
in a series of games like PD, UG, Dictator and risky choice tasks. Payment was
contingent on performance in one of all the economic games, chosen randomly
at the end of the session, in order to avoid wealth accumulation effects and
portfolio or hedging strategies. To avoid order effects, subjects were faced to the
aforementioned contexts in randomized orders.
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FIGURE 1 | Extensive form of the TG with real monetary payoffs and
numbers of subjects per player type and decision.
pairs per session), using specific software prepared in Java by
the IT team at the LEE3. The size of groups was dictated
by the equipment available in the LEE for measuring Skin
Conductance Responses (SCR) and HR variations. Continuous
EDA and electrocardiographic (ECG) data were recorded during
the entire experimental session using a BIOPAC MP150 system
and four TEL100C telemetry modules (BIOPAC systems, Inc.).
For EDA acquisition, two Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with isotonic
gel were placed on each subject’s distal phalanges of the middle
and the index fingers of the non-dominant hand. The skin
conductance signal was sampled at 125 Hz and low-pass filtered
oﬄine at 0.5 Hz using a Butterworth digital filter. SCR were
automatically detected and their amplitudes were quantified
using a custom version of the Matlab EDA toolbox.4 False
SCRs were removed after visual inspection of the entire signal.
SCRs were associated to a specific decision if their onset
appeared at least 1.0 s after subjects were informed about their
possible choices and before the moment of the decision. Only
responses above 0.02 microSiemens (µS) were considered as
valid.
For ECG acquisition two FLAT active electrodes (Ag/AgCl)
were arranged at a modified lead I configuration (i.e., right and
left wrists). The ECG signal was sampled at 1000 Hz and filtered
oﬄine using a band-pass 0.5 – 50 Hz filter. R-wave detection
and artifact correction were performed with the ECGLab Matlab
software (Carvalho et al., 2002). We used the KARDIA Matlab
software (Perakakis et al., 2010) and custom Matlab scripts
(Matlab 2013a, Mathworks Inc.) to analyze the heart period
signal during the experimental session. To assess the Phasic
Cardiac Responses (PCRs) to a single decision moment, we first
calculated the weighted average heart period for a time window
of 2 s following the presentation of the decision screen, using
the fractional counting procedure described in Dinh et al. (1999).
We subsequently subtracted the weighted average heart period
calculated for a window 0.5 s before cue onset, in order to
express heart period changes as differential values from baseline
activity.
3Software available upon request from A. Conde (alconvi@gmail.com) and J. V.
Guinot (jose.guinot@gmail.com), JOOMALIA-Doing3D. The protocol used for
the timing and communication between this software and the one used to measure
the ECG is explained in detail in Perakakis et al. (2013).
4Freely available at: https://github.com/mateusjoffily/EDA.
Measures
Personality Measures
We used two broad personality models that include impulsivity
and psychopathic-related dimensions, i.e., Eysenck’s three factor
model and McCrae and Costa’s Five Factor Model, and
a more specific test of both impulsivity and psychopathic
traits. Importantly, these traits have been closely related to
the aforementioned broad personality models (Whiteside and
Lynam, 2001; Miller et al., 2008).
The Spanish NEO-PI-R (Costa and McCrae, 1999) is a 240-
item self-report measure for quantifying 30 specific traits or
facets that define the five personality factors or domains: N,
E, O, A, and C. Items are responded to on 5-point Likert
scales ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).
The specific facets for A were: Trust, Straightforwardness,
Altruism, Compliance, Modesty and Tendermindedness. For
C: Competence, Order, Dutifulness, Achievement striving, Self-
discipline and Deliberation. For E: Warmth, Gregariousness,
Assertiveness, Activity, Excitement seeking and Positive emotion.
For N: Anxiety, Hostility, Depression, Self-Consciousness,
Impulsiveness and Vulnerability. Last, for O: Fantasy, Esthetics,
Feelings, Actions, Ideas and Values.
The Spanish Short version of the Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire-Revised (EPQ-RS; Ortet et al., 2001) assesses
Eysenck’s broad dimensions of P, E, and N. Each scale consists
of 12 items and the response alternatives are yes/no.
The Spanish version of the Levenson’s Self-Reported
Psychopathy Scale (LSRP, Lynam et al., 1999) is a 26-item four-
point scale that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly
agree). It include two related scales: the LSRP Primary or
Factor 1 scale is associated to an antagonistic interpersonal style
characteristic of psychopaths (i.e., low A, grandiosity, selfishness,
callousness, manipulativeness), whereas LSRP Secondary or
Factor 2 scale is more strongly related to disinhibition and
negative emotionality (i.e., anger-hostility, urgency, lack of
persistence and rashness; Miller et al., 2008; Lynam et al., 2011).
The UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale (Verdejo-García et al.,
2010) is a multidimensional inventory that assesses 5 personality
pathways contributing to impulsive behavior: negative urgency,
positive urgency, lack of perseverance, lack of premeditation, and
sensation seeking. The scale is composed of 59 items with a four-
point scale that ranges from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly
disagree).
The AR scale of the Differential Aptitude Test (DAT-5, Bennett
et al., 2005). This scale consists in a non-verbal AR test. Each
item includes four abstract figures following a given rule, and
the participant must choose one of five possible alternatives. The
score is the total number of correct responses. One advantage of
this test is that it is quite fast to implement: it is comprised of 40
multiple-choice items and has a 20 min time limit. AR would be
considered a marker of fluid intelligence (Colom et al., 2007), the
component of intelligence most related to general intelligence or
g factor (McGrew, 2009).
Risk Attitude Elicitation
We use two different incentive compatible elicitation procedures:
the widely used method by Holt and Laury (2002) (Risk aversion
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HL) and the Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) lottery-
panels (SGG).5
Following the HL procedure, subjects are presented with a list
of 10 pairwise choices between a safe (S) and a risky (R) lottery,
each one of which involves a good and a bad outcome. Then, the
difference between the good and the bad outcome in S is smaller
than that in R. The list of lottery pairs is created by varying the
probability of occurrence of the good outcome from p = 0.1 to
p = 1 in steps of 0.1. A subject’s risk aversion is an increasing
function of the number of choices in which he or she has chosen
the safe option. Given the monotonicity implied by the design,
the actual switching point from S to R is used as the measure of a
subject’s risk aversion.
In the lottery panel test, SGG, subjects are faced with eight sub-
tasks called panels 1, 2, 3... 8. Panels 1-4 involve only gains, while
5–8 involve mixed gambles. Each panel corresponds to a lottery
defined as the probability p of winning a prize X€, else nothing
in panels 1–4 (else a fixed loss of 1€ in panels 5–8). In all panels,
the winning probability is varied from p= 0.1 to p= 1 in steps of
0.1. Prizes are designed so that, within a panel, the expected value
of lotteries linearly increase in the probability of not winning by
a constant t over a fixed gain of 1€ in panels 1–4 and 0€ in panels
5–8. Then, t represents an incentive for subjects to choose riskier
choices. This parameter is increased from panel 1 to 4 and from
5 to 8. Thus, intuitively, a subject should be expected to make
riskier choices when moving from panel 1 to 4 and from 5 to 8.6
In order to estimate the participants’ score in SGG risk
attitudes, an exploratory factor analysis with principal axes factor
analysis and varimax rotation was performed. According to
eigenvalue and parallel analysis, two factors emerged: Factor
1 (Risk aversion F1), comprising Panels 5–8 (with factor
loadings from 0.70 to 0.87); and a relatively independent (Factor
correlation= 0.20) Factor 2 (Risk aversion F2) comprising Panels
1–4 (with factor loadings from 0.73 to 0.83). These two factors
explained 65.5% of the variance.
Trust Game
The TG has been implemented in the lab in different versions:
framed as a continuous investment game (Costa-Gomes et al.,
2014), discrete with multiple choices (Berg et al., 1995) or discrete
binary (Gambetta, 1988). Our experimental design is based on a
discrete version of the game with binary choices and no particular
framing. This strategy aims at reducing the space of investment
options in order to facilitate the detection of the cognitive and
emotional spectra activated by concentrating the observations
on just two possible actions. This has led to more clear-cut
data analysis, especially regarding the stimuli homogeneity for
emotional arousal studied through the physiological part of
our design. In this context, half of the participants acted as
5Attanasi et al. (2016) find no significant correlation between the two methods.
6García-Gallego et al. (2012) provide detailed discussion on the
multidimensionality of the test and its implications under expected utility
and alternative theories of decision making under risk. Three different aspects of
a subject’s risk attitude could be of interest here. First, whether a subject chooses
safer choices. This would reflect a subject’s risk aversion. Second, the sensitivity of
the subject’s choice to variations in t, measuring the incentive to take higher risks.
Third, choice differences among gain (panels 1–4) and mixed-domain (panels
5–8) gambles, attributed to a subject’s loss aversion.
P1 players (trustors, N = 110), whereas the rest acted as P2
players (trustees).7 Instructions to the subjects never mentioned
trust, investment or reciprocity, in order to avoid undesirable
experimenter demand effects. Figure 1 presents the payoffs
implemented in the game and the number of subjects who chose
each strategy.
If the P1 player decides not to trust, both players earn with
certainty an amount of 10€ each. But if the P1 player trusts P2,
the latter will have to choose whether to reciprocate, raising each
players’ earnings to 20€, or to behave individualistically, raising
own payoffs to 30€ and letting the trusting player down (5€).
Pairs were randomly formed and the game was played once in
its genuine sequential form. Each P1 players made the decision
whether to trust or not before P2 made the second stage decision,
provided that P1 had decided to trust in the first place. As shown
in Figure 1, 52 (35 females) out of 110 P1 subjects decided to
trust. From the 52 active P2 players, 33 (22 females) reciprocated
and 19 (11 females) exploited P1’s trust toward them.
Data Analyses
We conducted the descriptive analyses and calculated
correlations among all variables. In order to integrate the
highly inter-correlated personality measures and to identify
the basic personality domains underlying them, an Exploratory
Factor Analysis with the assessed personality dimensions from
different bio-dispositional models (NEO-PI-R and EPQ-RS), the
measure of psychopathy (LSRP), and the measure of specific
facets of impulsivity (UPPS-P) was performed.8 We used
principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation. A parallel
analysis with the Monte Carlo PA program was carried out to
select the number of retained factors. The regression scores for
each factor were kept as variables in the database and used later
in the regression analysis.
In order to study the relationship among personality, cognitive
ability and risk aversion variables on TG behaviors, mean
comparison and regression analysis were performed. Thus, t-tests
were calculated in order to determine whether the differences
in personality and intelligence scores between trust vs. no
trust groups, and reciprocate vs. no reciprocate groups were
statistically significant. In order to examine the role of personality
traits on the dichotomous choices in the TG, a Binary Logistic
Regression analysis was performed. In a first step, we controlled
for potentially confounding variables as age and gender; next,
we included the scores on the AR scale of DAT; last, we
included factor scores of personality traits. Factor scores were
7Whether the continuous version of the TG and its framing as a potentially
reciprocal investment situation is more realistic, is a matter of the real-life example
one has in mind. For example, there are situations in which a continuum of actions
is not available and trust comes in the form of discrete events, like for example,
signing first a contract or proposing marriage. In any case, the use of continuous vs.
discrete versions could not be fully equivalent, and may led to somewhat different
results. Thus, as observed by Schniter et al. (2016) when comparing this binary
version of the TG with a continuous version, although investments are higher in the
all-or-nothing game than in the continuous game, higher investments in the binary
game do not lead to higher returns. This suggests that subjects perceive intentions
not only by evaluating what others do but also by evaluating what others choose
not to do.
8See Markon et al. (2005) for a similar procedure.
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used instead of the 15 direct scores in order to capture the
basic personality domains underlying the highly inter-correlated
personality scales.9 All analyses were performed with the SPSS
statistic package, version 21.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics (median and standard
deviation) of the explanatory variables included in our study. As
usual, women presented higher scores in N, A, and lower scores
in psychopathy, P, and several facets of impulsivity (Costa and
McCrae, 1999; Ortet et al., 2001; Verdejo-García et al., 2010). In
our sample, women also presented lower scores in E and AR. Last,
and following Croson and Gneezy (2009) meta-analysis we find
that women are in general more risk averse than men in lottery
experiments.
Factor Analysis
When the factor analysis was performed, the first four factors
presented eigenvalues greater than 1, and the parallel analysis
9For a similar rationale and procedure, see Ibáñez et al. (2010).
suggested retaining four factors. The Barlett’s test for sphericity
(χ2 = 1654, 563; df = 105, p<0.000) and the Kaiser-Meyer-
Oklin (KMO = 0.729) indicated that the extraction method
used was adequate to the data. Table 2 shows the factor
loadings of the personality scales in the factor solution.
The factors corresponded to Unconscientious disinhibition,
Neuroticism/negative emotionality, Extraversion/positive
emotionality and Disagreeable disinhibition and accounted for
60% of the total variance.
Mean Comparisons
First, we split the sample of P1 players according to their
strategy. Factor scores presented statistical differences between
those participants who trust vs. those that do not trust in the
Extraversion/positive emotionality factor (t = 2.117; p = 0.037).
Figure 2 shows that trusting and non-trusting P1 subjects
exhibited similar means in all personality characteristics except
in positive urgency, in which players who trust scored higher
than non-trusting players. In addition, trustors also presented a
non-significant tendency in the E dimension of both EPQ-R and
NEO PI-R questionnaires (p = 0.06 and p = 0.10, respectively).
When focusing on specific facets, trusting participants scored
significantly higher in the Warmth facet of the E dimension than
TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations and test of differences between men and women (t-test for personality variables and MW test for SGG and HL
scores on risk attitudes) of the variables included in the study.
Total (N = 222) Men (M = 84) Women (F = 138)
M SD M SD M SD Mean comparison
LSRP primary 15.41 6.52 18.49 6.73 13.54 5.64 −5.891∗∗
LSRP secondary 9.41 3.64 9.51 3.64 9.36 3.65 −0.311
Neuroticism-NEO 92.92 23.40 85.69 24.47 97.33 21.65 3.695∗∗
Extraversion-NEO 116.80 19.71 120.50 18.86 114.54 19.94 −2.203∗
Openness-NEO 116.59 18.38 114.76 19.70 117.70 17.50 1.157
Agreeableness-NEO 116.50 18.61 107.61 17.29 121.91 17.30 5.975∗∗
Conscientiousness-NEO 113.68 23.40 112.93 20.14 114.14 25.24 0.373
Extraversion –EPQ 8.61 3.12 9.26 2.63 8.22 3.33 −2.445∗
Neuroticism –EPQ 4.78 3.57 4.12 3.36 5.19 3.65 2.181∗
Psychoticism-EPQ 3.00 2.46 3.69 2.56 2.59 2.30 −3.317∗
Premeditation-UPPS 31.01 5.21 30.44 4.41 31.36 4.38 −1.505
Negative urgency-UPPS 27.00 3.12 26.48 5.22 27.33 5.19 −1.181
Sensation seeking-UPPS 31.59 7.58 34.75 7.24 29.66 7.14 −5.123∗∗
Perseverance-UPPS 25.35 3.18 25.02 3.15 25.55 3.20 1.198
Positive urgency-UPPS 26.48 7.62 27.96 7.32 25.58 7.68 −2.284∗
DAT-RA 23.95 6.58 25.51 6.00 22.99 6.76 −2.808∗∗
SGG Panel 1 probability 0.48 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.51 0.24 −2.377∗
SGG Panel 2 probability 0.43 0.20 0.42 0.20 0.44 0.21 0.787
SGG Panel 3 probability 0.42 0.20 0.37 0.21 0.45 0.20 −2.613∗∗
SGG Panel 4 probability 0.40 0.21 0.36 0.20 0.43 0.21 −2.267∗
SGG Panel 5 probability 0.54 0.28 0.52 0.32 0.55 0.26 −0.813
SGG Panel 6 probability 0.50 0.27 0.49 0.28 0.51 0.26 −0.524
SGG Panel 7 probability 0.48 0.25 0.46 0.28 0.49 0.23 −1.205
SGG Panel 8 probability 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.45 0.22 −0.962
HL Number of Safe Lotteries 6.79 1.97 6.39 2.27 7.03 1.73 −1.903+
+p < 0.10; ∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
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TABLE 2 | Principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation of the
personality scales.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Conscientiousness NEO –0.86 –0.28 0.01 –0.06
Premeditation UPPS –0.78 0.07 –0.18 0.02
Perseverance UPPS –0.73 0.04 0.08 0.02
Psychopathy secondary LSRP 0.56 0.48 –0.02 0.26
Psychoticism EPQ 0.51 0.10 0.16 0.33
Neuroticism NEO 0.07 0.81 –0.34 –0.07
Neuroticism EPQ –0.03 0.77 –0.25 0.06
Negative urgency UPPS 0.10 0.74 0.15 0.20
Positive urgency UPPS 0.19 0.43 0.25 0.34
Extraversion NEO –0.12 –0.16 0.89 –0.03
Extraversion EPQ –0.01 –0.20 0.77 –0.01
Sensation seeking UPPS 0.19 0.06 0.53 0.27
Openness NEO 0.16 0.06 0.46 –0.25
Psychopathy primary LSRP 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.92
Agreeableness NEO –0.09 –0.16 0.09 –0.70
Exp. Var. 24.26% 17.16% 10.48% 8.16%
Bold, loadings higher than 0.30. Exp. Var., percentage of variance explained. Factor
1, unconscientious disinhibition; Factor 2, negative emotionality; Factor 3, positive
emotionality; Factor 4, disagreeable disinhibition.
non-trusting participants (t = 2.020; p = 0.046) and showed a
non-significant tendency in scoring lower on Angry-hostility facet
of the N dimension (t =−1.820; p= 0.072).
We split now the sample of active, deciding (N = 52)
P2 players according to their strategy in the second stage
of the game. Factor scores presented statistical differences
between trustees that reciprocate vs. non-reciprocate in the
Disagreeable disinhibition factor (t = −2.885; p = 0.006)
and Negative emotionality factor (t = −2.449; p = 0.018),
whereas Unconscientious disinhibition factor also presented a
non-significant tendency (t = −1.911; p = 0.062). Figure 3
depicts the mean differences in specific scales. Thus, it can
be observed that trustees who display a reciprocal behavior
have significantly lower levels in psychopathy-related traits than
subjects who have opted for the individualistic reaction to
their trusting counterpart. These differences are evident on the
primary and secondary psychopathy and on P. Players who
reciprocate also presented a non-significant tendency in A,
mainly attributed to the significant mean differences found in
the A facet of Straightforwardness (t = 2.611; p = 0.012). In
addition, players who did not reciprocate presented higher scores
on disinhibition-related traits, as positive and negative urgency,
low persistence, sensation seeking, low C and the Impulsivity scale
of N (t = 2.129; p= 0.038).
Regression Analysis and Correlations
We present in Table 3 the predictive power of the factors
underlying the questionnaires on trust and reciprocity
behaviors. Despite gender differences found in predictors,
neither age nor gender associate to any dependent variable. Once
controlled for these variables, neither cognitive ability nor risk
aversion associate with trust, but higher AR predicted higher
reciprocation. Regarding personality, the Positive emotionality
factor that included E scales, predicted trust behavior, whereas
Disagreeable disinhibition factor, which included primary
psychopathy, P, positive urgency and low A scales, predicted
non-reciprocation. In addition, Unconscientious disinhibition
and Negative Emotionality factors presented a marginally non-
significant association with no reciprocation behavior, probably
reflecting the role of impulsivity on this behavior.
We look now at the results obtained from the physiological
data. Interbeat intervals, measured one second after a screen is
shown to P1 asking them to make a decision, significantly and
negatively correlate with primary (Spearman,−0.338, p= 0.007)
and total (Spearman, −0.314, p = 0.013) LSRP scores. Also,
the amplitude of SCR corresponding to the same moment
significantly correlates with primary (Spearman, 0.267, p= 0.015)
and total (Spearman, 0.235, p = 0.033) LSRP scores. Both
patterns indicate the relevance of the decision to trust in terms
of attentional resources involved, and the emotions triggered in
conjunction with the decision makers personality.
DISCUSSION
The present study addresses factors that can account for
individual differences in behavior of participants in the TG. To
this end, we selected a wide range of personality constructs that
might be useful in explaining the heterogeneity observed.
In order to integrate the different personality characteristics
assessed within the FFM framework, we performed an
exploratory factor analysis. We found a four-factor structure
virtually identical to the one described by Markon et al. (2005)
and similar to the ones found in other studies with a wide
variety of personality scales (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1993; Ortet
et al., 2002; Aluja et al., 2004; Ibáñez et al., 2010). According
to the nomenclature in Markon et al. (2005), the four factors
we obtained were labeled Positive Emotionality, Negative
Emotionality, Disagreeable Disinhibition and Unconscientious
Disinhibition. These factors are closely linked to the FFM of
personality except for O, probably because this domain is not
well represented in other personality models apart from the FFM
(Markon et al., 2005).
Particularly relevant for the present research was the location
of impulsivity and psychopathy scales within the FFM space.
In reference to psychopathy, we found that subscales of the
LSRP, although interrelated, loaded in two different factors:
primary psychopathy characterized as manipulation, cheating,
callousness and lack of remorse loaded in the Disagreeable
Disinhibition factor, and would be mainly related to low A;
while secondary psychopathy, characterized by impulsivity and
deviant behavior, loaded in the Unconscientious Disinhibition
factor and would be mainly related to low C, in line with
previous findings (Miller et al., 2008). In relation to impulsivity,
it constitutes a complex multifaceted construct of pervasive
importance in psychology (Evenden, 1999). In an attempt to add
clarity to the impulsivity concept, Whiteside and Lynam (2001)
identified four distinct components of impulsivity (i.e., urgency,
sensation seeking, perseverance, and deliberation) and located
them within the FFM framework. Posterior studies subdivided
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FIGURE 2 | Mean differences in personality scores between non-trusting (N = 58) and trusting (N = 52) P1 players. E, extraversion; N, neuroticism; A,
agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; O, openness; PRE, premeditation; PERS, perseverance; SS, sensation seeking; − URG, negative urgency; + URG, positive
urgency; P, psychoticism; Total, psychopathy; Primary, primary psychopathy; Secondary, secondary psychopathy; AR, abstract reasoning. +p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.01.
urgency in two facets, negative urgency, and positive urgency
(Cyders et al., 2007; Cyders and Smith, 2008). These facets
were conceived as reflecting different ‘pathways’ to impulsive
behavior. Accordingly, we found perseverance and deliberation
to be closely linked to C, sensation seeking to E, and negative and
positive urgency to N, although positive urgency would also be
associated to low A and low C, in line with past research (Cyders
and Smith, 2008).
With respect to the individual differences in the TG, first
we deal with trusting behavior. Different approaches have been
proposed to define and explain trust behavior (see Bauer, 2015).
Recently Thielmann and Hilbig (2015b) have systematically
reviewed the multiple basic processes underlying trusting
behavior among strangers and its relationship to personality
characteristics. They proposed that four main components
would be relevant in the decision to trust: (a) attitudes toward
risky prospects (i.e., risk aversion and loss aversion), (b)
betrayal sensitivity, (c) trustworthiness expectations, and (d)
sensitivity to reward. Importantly, individual differences in these
processes would be casually linked to personality characteristics,
so examining the relationship between personality and trust
behavior would help in determining which of these mechanisms
could be more relevant in the TG.
According to our results, the main mechanisms involved
in trusting behavior in our experiment would be Reward
sensitivity. Thielmann and Hilbig (2015b) suggested that some
individuals might place attention on the potential reward
inherent in a positive social interaction, so, individuals
more sensible to reward, i.e., scoring high in Extraversion-
related traits, should perceive social interactions as particularly
rewarding per se and therefore be highly motivated to approach
such interactions (Depue and Collins, 1999; Denissen and
Penke, 2008). Accordingly, we found that Extraversion/positive
emotionality, and specifically the facet of warmth associate
to trust. People scoring high in warmth are friendly, easily
forming close attachment to others (Costa and McCrae, 1999).
In accordance to our results, some other studies have also found
a similar role of E on trusting behavior (Swope et al., 2008;
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FIGURE 3 | Mean differences in personality scores between non-reciprocating (N = 33) and reciprocating (N = 19) P2 players. E, extraversion; N,
neuroticism; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; O, openness; PRE, premeditation; PERS, perseverance; SS, sensation seeking; − URG, negative urgency; +
URG, positive urgency; P, psychoticism; Total, psychopathy; Primary, primary psychopathy; Secondary, secondary psychopathy; AR, abstract reasoning. +p < 0.10,
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010; Haring et al., 2013), suggesting
that trustors’ investments have a component of facilitation of
social relations by expecting a large gain from trust. This
interpretation would be reaffirmed by the fact that we have also
found an association of trust and positive urgency, the tendency
to engage in rash action in response to high positive affect (Cyders
and Smith, 2008), suggesting that part of this behavior is linked to
a non-deliberative rash behavior in front of a perceived appetitive
situation.
In contrast to our hypothesis, we have not found any
association between A and trust. The hypothetical process
underlying the relevance of A on trust would be the development
trustworthiness expectations via social projection. To form
an expectation about the other’s likely behavior, the trustor
can consider different sources of information, as trust cues
(i.e., reputation), prior trust experiences, or social projection
(Thielmann and Hilbig, 2015b). Social projection implies that
people would predict others cooperativeness by projecting
their own cooperative preferences onto them (Krueger, 2013).
In terms of the FFM, one’s cooperation and trustworthiness
should be mainly covered by the A domain, so agreeable
people would expect others to behave more cooperatively and
reciprocate. Accordingly, Evans and Revelle (2008) and Becker
et al. (2012) found a slight but significant effect of A on the
amounts invested in the TG, and Müller and Schwieren (2012)
confirmed the relevance of trust and straightforwardness for
this behavior. However, in line of our results, other studies
have not found association between A and investment behavior
(Swope et al., 2008; Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010; Haring
et al., 2013). The fact that we and others have failed to
find significant associations could be reflecting the difficulty
in detecting modest effect sizes, as those described for the
associations between A and investment behavior (Zhao and
Smillie, 2015).
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TABLE 3 | Hierarchical Logistic Regression analysis with Trust and Reciprocate behavior as dependent variables.
Trust (52 vs. 58) Reciprocate (33 vs. 19)
R2 (Cox and Snell-Nagelkerke) B R2 (Cox and Snell-Nagelkerke) B
Step 1 Gender (0 = male; 1 = female) 0.003–0.004 −0.232 0.003–0.004 −0.360
Age 0.000 −0.086
Step 2 Fluid intelligence 0.005–0.007 −0.015 0.107–0.146∗ 0.102∗
Step 3 Unconscientious disinhibition 0.056–0.075 −0.182 0.322–0.441∗∗ −0.738+
Negative emotionality −0.003 −0.693+
Positive emotionality 0.485∗ 0.276
Disagreeable disinhibition −0.096 −1.057∗
Step 4 Risk aversion HL 0.066–0.088 −0.022 0.337−0.462 0.038
Risk aversion F1 SGG −0.128 0.042
Risk aversion F2 SGG 0.058 −0.432
Gender, age, fluid intelligence and personality factor scores as predictors (N in parenthesis). +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
Our data also indicate the minor role on trust of the other two
proposed mechanisms, betrayal sensitivity and attitudes toward
risky prospects (Thielmann and Hilbig, 2015b). In terms of FFM,
individual differences in these mechanisms would be linked to N,
mainly the facet of angry hostility for betrayal sensitivity ((Maltby
et al., 2008; Thielmann and Hilbig, 2015b) and the facet of
anxiety for attitudes toward risk (Thielmann and Hilbig, 2015b).
However, in line with previous findings (Evans and Revelle,
2008; Swope et al., 2008; Becker et al., 2012), no association
between trust behavior and N-domain nor its facets are found.
In addition, no association between trusting behavior and risk
aversion measures have been found (Bohnet and Zeckhauser,
2004; Bohnet et al., 2008; Houser et al., 2010). These findings
are important because they reinforce the idea that risk attitudes
would not be successful in organizing trust behavior (Fehr, 2009).
Thus, and to sum up, our data suggest that the more important
mechanism underlying individual differences in the TG was
sensitivity to reward. Attitudes toward risky prospects, betrayal
sensitivity or trustworthiness expectations would exert a minor
role, presenting low effect sizes that would be difficult to detect
with the sample size used in the present research.
Once P1 has decided to cooperate (i.e., trust), P2 can exploit
the other’s trust or can correspond with reciprocity. Reciprocity
constitutes a key mechanism for explaining cooperative behavior
among non-relatives, receiving strong attention from several
disciplines, especially economics and evolutionary biology
(Trivers, 1971; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Falk and Fischbacher,
2006; Nowak, 2006; Tooby et al., 2006; Guala, 2012). Reciprocity
could be understood as the tendency to respond “nicely” to
nice actions (positive reciprocity) and “nastily” to nasty actions
(negative reciprocity) when interacting with other players.
Reciprocity can be beneficial for both parts (weak reciprocity),
or even may involve a cost for responders (strong reciprocity).
Cooperation usually emerges in repeated encounters within the
same pair of individuals, helping each other (direct reciprocity).
Nevertheless, cooperation is also extensively observed between
strangers, probably because of an expected indirect gain (indirect
reciprocity) like good reputation.
Conversely, a non-reciprocal subject may benefit from
exploiting others’ trust. Exploitative behavior has received some
attention recently, specifically from an evolutionary perspective
(Mealey, 1995; Buss and Duntley, 2008; Lalumière et al.,
2010; Glenn et al., 2011). According to this view, exploitation
is a main class of strategies for acquiring reproductively
relevant resources that consist in expropriating the resources
of others through exploitation. This class of strategies ranges
from mild, such as failing to reciprocate a minor favor in
a social exchange, to extreme, such as coalitional warfare to
expropriate all of an opposing group’s reproductively relevant
assets (Buss and Duntley, 2008). The personality characteristic
most strongly associated to exploitation would be low A and its
extreme, psychopathy (Buss, 2009). From an evolutionary point
of view, psychopathic behavior would constitute a successful
alternative strategy at a low relative frequency in the population,
whereby a small number of individuals take advantage of their
more populous, cooperative counterparts by defecting in social
interactions (Mealey, 1995; Lalumière et al., 2010; Glenn et al.,
2011). Surprisingly, psychopathic traits had not been formerly
explored in the TG so far.
As a result of our approach, we obtained the novel finding
that those individuals that did not reciprocate were higher in
Disagreeable disinhibition. Specifically, non-reciprocators scored
higher in both primary and secondary Levenson psychopathy
scales, P, and low C. Conversely, the decision to reciprocate in
order to reward a kind action would depend on the A FFM
dimension, and, specifically, on straightforwardness. Individuals
scoring high in straightforwardness would be honest, sincere and
ingenuous, whereas low scorers would be dishonest and would
tend to manipulate others through flattery or deception (Costa
and McCrae, 1999). Along this line, some studies have found
that the most relevant personality domain for reciprocation
is A (Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010; Becker et al., 2012;
Lönnqvist et al., 2012), especially its honesty aspects (Thielmann
and Hilbig, 2015a). Thus, from an evolutionary personality
perspective, reciprocal-exploitative behaviors would be located
on a continuum of opposite strategies regarding behavior in
cooperative situations, and the personality domain linked to this
continuum would be the dimension of A.
In addition, our results also suggest that impulsivity would
play a relevant role in trust and, especially in reciprocal behavior.
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To our knowledge, the present study is the first to systematically
examine the role of this complex trait in the TG. We have
found that a specific facet of impulsivity, positive urgency,
is related to trusting behavior. Positive urgency refers to the
tendency to engage in rash action as a response to high
positive affect. This suggests that trusting behavior would be
considered as a positive and potentially rewarding situation
and that the decision to trust is partially guided by impulsive
tendencies. In the same vein, reciprocal behavior also involves
a non-reflexive component of the take-the-money-and-run type
behavior, with individuals who are more sensitive to reward
(sensation seeking), less perseverant, and score higher in urgency,
both positive and negative, presenting rash responses of non-
reciprocation. We think that these results, if replicated, could
be theoretically relevant since they point to a the role of
hot impulsive and non-reflexive mechanisms at the basis of
trust (e.g., Murray et al., 2011) and reciprocity, in contrast
to a more classical view of economic decisions associated
with a more cold reflexive and calculative vision of human
behavior.
The physiological results show that P1 participants scoring
high in psychopathy exhibit increased EDA at the moment
in which they are asked to decide whether to trust. At the
same time, the P1 group show reduced evoked HR deceleration,
indicating decreased attentional engagement during the decision-
making process. Taken together, these two findings suggest that
high psychopathy scorers perceive the decision-making task as
less demanding compared to low-scorers, despite physiological
changes signaling increased emotional arousal. No significant
differences in EDA or HR variation arise between trusting vs.
non-trusting or reciprocating vs. non-reciprocating participants.
According to the somatic marker hypothesis, decision-making
is influenced by physiological signals that arise in bioregulatory
processes, including those expressed as emotions (Damasio,
1996). Numerous studies have shown that emotional activation
guides decision making in healthy subjects, while this effect
is reduced in patients with orbitofrontal dysfunction (Bechara
et al., 2000). Interestingly, psychopathic personality traits and
antisocial behavior (clinical and sub-clinical) have been linked
to orbitofrontal dysfunction (Dinn et al., under review). While
previous research associated psychopathic behavior with reduced
EDA (Lorber, 2004; Casey et al., 2013), our findings may indicate
an alternative mechanism to promote antisocial behavior by
suppressing the influence of somatic markers in decision making.
This study has several limitations. First, the magnitude of
personality association with trust is modest and, therefore, some
effects may not have been detected due to the relatively small
sample size. Although the effects were greater in magnitude
for reciprocal behavior, the reduced number of participants in
the reciprocating and non-reciprocating groups led to a low
statistical power in part of our analysis. Also in relation to the
sample, it is important to highlight that our results are referred
to non-clinical population, and therefore, the generalization to
clinically relevant samples such as psychopaths should be made
with caution. Another limitation, and a potentially source of
discrepancies with other studies, is the discrete TG version used
in present experiment, in contrast to the more usual continuous
version used. Nevertheless, one strength of the present analysis
is the inclusion not only of many personality domains, but
also of specific traits relevant for particular behaviors (such as
psychopathy for non-reciprocal behavior). However, and even
though fluid intelligence has been used as a marker of general
cognitive ability (Colom et al., 2007), other cognitive abilities have
not been examined (McGrew, 2009). Thus, future research would
benefit from including a larger number of participants, the use of
clinical samples, and a broader selection of personality, economic
and cognitive variables.
To conclude, although A and E are primarily dimensions
of interpersonal behavior, E is related to the preferred quantity
of social stimulation and A represents the characteristic quality
of the interaction (Costa et al., 1991). Accordingly, the present
study suggests that E could be relevant for initiating cooperation,
whereas A could be relevant for maintaining it. That is, different
personality domains would represent different strategies in the
social domain, one based in the number of social contacts
and the other in the cohesion of such contacts. With respect
to the E domain, high E would favor a risky behavior that
may increase the number of social partners. On the other
hand, individuals scoring high in A would reward kind actions,
even if this reward involves some cost for them. Conversely,
low agreeable/high psychopathic and disinhibited/rash impulsive
individuals would benefit from this situation, by taking the
money and running!
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